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Transitive inference has the form, if a > b and b > c, then the conclusion a > c follows, where > is an asymmetric transitive relation and a, b and c are the elements. For example,
Tom is taller than Jessica and Jessica is taller than Lucy therefore Tom is taller than Lucy.
Most people make transitive inferences by integrating the elements into an ordered left-right or top-down array (Prado, VanDer Henst, & Noveck, 2008) . Once the premises are integrated, it is simple to confirm by inspecting the array, Tom -Jessica -Lucy that Tom is taller than Lucy.
Premise integration is central to transitive inference. In a dual-task experiment with probe reaction time as the secondary task, the highest processing load occurred when premises were being integrated (Maybery, Bain, & Halford, 1986) . Premise integration is difficult for young children (Andrews & Halford, 1998; Bunch & Andrews, 2012) .
Integration capacity declines in later adulthood (Andrews & Todd, 2008) and is seriously impaired following lesions to the prefrontal cortex (Waltz, Knowlton, Holyoak, Boone, Mishkin, De Menezes Santos et al., 1999) .
Given the importance of premise integration, it is crucial to ensure that it cannot be circumvented. Thayer and Collyer (1978) described a non-integrative, labelling strategy. In the previous example, Tom is mentioned once as the taller person and Lucy as the shorter person. Thus, Tom would be labelled as tall and Lucy as short. The conclusion can be evaluated by referring to these labels, without integrating the premises. Labelling is avoided This removes the advantage of labelling. Participants must integrate the premises to reach the conclusion. Andrews (2010) examined heuristic and analytic processing in five-term transitive inference problems. Acceptance rates were higher for believable than unbelievable, and valid 5 than invalid conclusions, consistent with the use of heuristic and analytic processing.
Premise integration difficulty was manipulated by varying the time allowed for premise encoding and integration (Experiment 1); by presenting premises in a scrambled top-down order versus the order that was consistent with the elements in the five-term series (i.e., a > b, b > c, c > d, d > e), which allowed a simpler concatenation strategy (Experiment 2); and by varying lexical markedness (Experiment 3). Premise integration was expected to be easier when unmarked terms (e.g., longer) were used in four premises than when unmarked terms and marked terms (e.g., shorter) were used in two premises each. In all experiments, more heuristic processing and less analytic processing occurred in conditions where premise integration was more difficult.
The current study extended this research. One purpose was to determine whether the believability effects would be replicated when three response options (accept, reject, cannot tell) were available. To accommodate this, non-integrable problems were presented as well as VB, VU, IB and IU problems. Non-integrable problems had four premises, a > b, b > c, d If participants who give non-normative responses for VU and IB problems do not rely on heuristic processing, they would be expected to respond "cannot tell" and this would weaken the believability effect on acceptance rates. With three response options, beliefbased responses on conflict problems can be more clearly identified. Rejecting VU conclusions or accepting IB conclusions are belief-based errors. Cannot tell responses are also incorrect, but they cannot be described as belief-based errors. To the extent that the 6 errors on conflict problems are due to heuristic processing, more belief-based errors than cannot tell errors would be expected.
Specific dual-process models have been proposed to account for belief bias in categorical syllogisms. Stupple and Ball (2008) characterized these as belief-first, reasoningfirst or parallel-process models, according to the sequence in which heuristic and analytic processing occur. In belief-first models, believable conclusions are initially accepted and unbelievable conclusions are initially rejected. Belief-based responses are either supported or inhibited by subsequent analytic processing, although not all reasoners engage the analytic route (Stupple Ball, Evans, & Kamal-Smith, 2011) . In reasoning-first models, people first attempt to reason analytically, but they fall back on heuristic processing if analytic processing fails (Stupple & Ball, 2008) . In parallel-process models, heuristic processing and analytic processing proceed simultaneously and each produces a response. When the two responses differ, the conflict must be resolved (Sloman, 1996) .
A key issue for dual process models of belief bias is how conflict is detected and resolved. This requires that heuristic and analytic processing overlap in time or at least that their outputs are simultaneously available. This is somewhat problematic for serial models because both processes are not always engaged. However, parallel models have been criticized as wasteful of scarce cognitive resources. Both processes are always engaged, even though heuristic processing would often suffice. The logical intuition model (De Neys, 2012) resolves this by proposing an intuitive logical process that is distinct from both deliberate (analytic) processing and intuitive heuristic processing. Intuitive logical and heuristic processes are automatically engaged from the outset. Analytic processing is triggered by conflict between the two intuitive processes. Conflict detection occurs automatically, but analytic processing is needed to resolve the conflict.
Confidence ratings provide a potential indicator of conflict-detection. Andrews (2010) found that participants' confidence in their evaluations was lower for conflict than non-conflict problems indicating that confidence was sensitive to the belief-logic conflict.
However it is unclear whether conflict detection occurs automatically as proposed in the logical intuition model (De Neys, 2012) , or whether it is a more deliberate process. In the current study, conflict detection scores were computed and potential links with heuristic and analytic processing were examined. If conflict detection is deliberate, then significant associations with analytic processing would be expected.
Individual differences in heuristic and analytic processing were also examined. Fluid intelligence is the ability to adapt to new situations and understand relationships. Dualprocess approaches claim that intelligence is related to analytic processing, but is relatively independent of heuristic processing (Stanovitch & West, 2008) . Empirical findings are supportive. Intelligence was positively correlated with analytic (not heuristic) processing in categorical syllogisms (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright & Farrelly, 2004) . In Andrews'
(2010) research on transitive inference, higher fluid intelligence and better premise integration ability (assessed separately) predicted analytic processing. Premise integration capacity involves being able to mentally combine premises and to recognize when integration is not possible. Andrews' (2010) premise integration task required the former, whereas the non-integrable problems in the current study require the latter. Premise integration capacity and fluid intelligence should predict analytic processing in valid and invalid problems.
Method Participants
The participants were 67 students (15 males, 52 females) enrolled in psychology courses at Griffith University, Australia. Their mean age was 25.86 years (SD = 11.28). All were native speakers of English. Thirty-three and thirty-four participants received problem sets 1 and 2 respectively.
Materials and Procedure
The transitive inference problems, plausibility ratings task and the fluid intelligence test were administered to small groups of participants.
Transitive inference. In each of two sets, there were 24 problems, four instances of the six problem types. The VB, VU, IB and IU problems were drawn from Andrews (2010) .
The NB and NU were generated anew. See Table 1 The problems were presented using PowerPoint software, with images projected onto a large white screen. Instructions were shown on the screen and read aloud by the researcher.
Participants were instructed to read the premises, think about how they related to each other, and to assume that all premises were true. When the conclusion appeared, they were to evaluate it in relation to the premises.
Three practice problems with neutral content were presented, one valid, one invalid, and one non-integrable. On each problem, the ready signal was presented for 3 seconds, then the premises were displayed in a scrambled top-down order for 30 seconds, followed by the conclusion for 10 seconds, then the respond now signal for 10 seconds. Participants recorded their responses (accept, reject, cannot tell) on the sheet provided and rated their confidence in 9 each decision as 0 (low), 1 (medium), or 2 (high). Feedback after each problem encouraged participants to integrate the premises and to recognize when integration was not possible.
The procedure for test problems was similar but the durations were briefer: ready (3 seconds); premises (20 seconds); conclusions (5 seconds); respond now (5 seconds), and no feedback was provided. Test problems were arranged into four 6-item blocks, each containing one problem of each type. A 30-second break was inserted after each block.
Premises were presented first followed by the conclusion. This procedure encourages forward reasoning from premises, rather than backward reasoning from conclusions as occurs with simultaneous presentation. In research using the production paradigm which requires forward reasoning, belief bias in categorical syllogisms was eliminated (Morley, Evans & Handley, 2004) . However, Andrews (2010) observed significant believability effects in transitive inference using sequential presentation. Use of sequential presentation allows comparison with Andrews' findings.
Participants also rated the plausibility of the conclusions of the test problems (presented alone) on a 7-point scale (1 = extremely implausible to 7 = extremely plausible).
Fluid intelligence. Fluid intelligence was assessed using the Culture Fair Test, Scale 2, Form A (Cattell & Cattell, 1973) . The four subtests, Series, Classification, Matrices and Conditions, were administered using standard procedures. Subtest scores were summed (max.
= 46).

Results and Discussion
Conclusion plausibility.
Single-sample t-tests confirmed that rated plausibility of believable conclusions was higher than the neutral midpoint (4) in set 1 (M = 5.39, SD = .65), t (32) = 12.36, p < .001, and set 2 (M = 6.01, SD = .64), t (33) = 18.35, p < .001. Plausibility of unbelievable conclusions was lower than the neutral midpoint in set 1 (M = 2.20, SD = .75), t (32) = -13.66, p < .001, and set 2 (M = 2.99, SD = .69), t (33) = -8.50, p < .001.
Conclusion evaluations.
In the standard conclusion evaluation procedure (Evans, 2007) there are two response options (accept, reject). Acceptance rates are analyzed but rejection rates are not. The current procedure involved three response options. For descriptive purposes we analyzed all three, while recognizing that the measures are not independent.
Preliminary analysis revealed no significant differences between problem sets and no gender differences in fluid intelligence, acceptance, rejection and cannot tell rates, nor the indices derived from them. Figure 1 shows the acceptance, rejection and cannot tell rates.
Acceptance. Acceptance rates were subjected to a 3 × 2 repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with validity (valid, invalid, indeterminate) and believability The overall Validity × Believability interaction was not significant (partial η 2 = .03).
However, the interaction of believability with the contrast between valid versus invalid problems approached significance, F (1, 66) = 3.86, p = .054, partial η 2 = .06. The believability effect tended to be larger for invalid (partial η 2 = .38) than valid (partial η 2 = .12) problems. The believability effect was significant for non-integrable problems (partial η 2 = .17). Believable conclusions were (incorrectly) accepted more frequently than 11 unbelievable conclusions.
The believability effects observed on acceptance rates for VB, VU, IB and IU conclusions by Andrews (2010) were replicated despite the possibility that the cannot tell option would eliminate the effect. conclusions.
Rejection
In summary, acceptance rates were highest for valid problems, rejection rates were highest for invalid problems, and cannot tell rates were highest for non-integrable problems, providing evidence of analytic processing. Heuristic processing on problems with determinate (valid or invalid) conclusions was evident on acceptance and rejection rates, but not cannot tell rates. For non-integrable problems, it was evident on acceptance and cannot tell rates, but not rejection rates.
There were more belief-based than cannot tell errors on VU problems, t (66) = 3.59, p = .001, and IB problems, t (66) = 5.40, p < .001, suggesting that participants recognized when a determinate conclusion was required even though they did not correctly resolve the belieflogic conflict. On non-integrable problems, erroneous acceptance of believable conclusions exceeded erroneous rejection of unbelievable conclusions, t (66) = 2.45, p = .017.
Confidence.
Confidence ratings are shown in Believability also interacted with the contrast between problems with invalid and indeterminate conclusions, F (1, 65) = 24.60, p < .001, partial η 2 = .28. Confidence was lower for NU than NB problems, F (1, 66) = 4.38, p = .04, partial η 2 = .06, but the reverse was the case for invalid problems.
Correlates of heuristic and analytic processing.
Three indices were computed from acceptance rates for valid and invalid problems (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) . The logic index (VB + VU -IB -IU) reflects analytic processing; the belief index (VB + IB -VU -IU) reflects heuristic processing (belief bias); and the interaction index (VU + IB -VB -IU) reflects the extent to which the belief bias is greater on invalid than valid problems. Conflict detection scores reflecting how much higher confidence was for non-conflict than conflict problems were also computed. Cannot tell responses for NB and NU problems were positively correlated, r = .45, p < .001. They were averaged and used as a measure of premise integration ability.
Premise integration and fluid intelligence were positively correlated with the logic index ( Table 2) . When entered as predictors in a multiple regression analysis they accounted for 28% of variance in the logic index. Premise integration (8.8%, p = .007) and fluid intelligence (6.7%, p = .018) accounted for unique variance (Table 3) . Conflict detection 14 scores were not significantly correlated with the logic index, fluid intelligence, or premise integration. Conflict detection appears not to involve analytic processing.
The positive correlation between conflict detection and the belief index approached significance (p = .054). Conflict detection did not protect against belief-bias.
Premise integration and conflict detection were negatively correlated with the interaction index. When entered as predictors in a multiple regression analysis, they accounted for 15.7% of variance in the interaction index. Premise integration (5.76%, p = .041) and conflict detection (6.55%, p = .029) accounted for unique variance (Table 3) .
Better premise integration and conflict detection were associated with smaller interaction indices. Recall that this index reflects the extent to which belief bias is greater for invalid than valid problems. Follow-up analyses showed that premise integration was negatively correlated with belief bias on invalid, r = -.323, p = .008, but not valid problems (p = .444).
Conflict detection was positively correlated with belief bias on valid, r = .355, p = .003, but not invalid problems (p = .81). The correlation with belief bias on valid problems seems to stem from cannot tell responses. Higher conflict detection scores (for valid problems) were associated with lower cannot tell rates on VB problems, r = -.28, p = .02, and tended to be associated with higher cannot tell rates on VU problems, r = .21, p = .09. To the extent that lower cannot tell rates translate to higher acceptance rates, and higher cannot tell rates translate to lower acceptance rates, the belief bias will be larger.
These differential associations with belief bias suggest that whereas premise integration involves analytic processing that is required for conflict resolution, conflict detection does not.
General Discussion
The research extended our understanding of belief bias in three ways. First, it demonstrated that belief bias in transitive inference is robust. It occurred with sequential presentation which encourages forward reasoning from premises (analytic processing) and when reasoners could give cannot tell responses instead of belief-based responses.
Availability of the cannot tell option did not eliminate the believability effect, which was also evident on non-integrable problems. The findings are consistent with a heuristic process that is distinct from analytic processing.
Second, it provided further evidence of individual differences. Premise integration ability predicted analytic processing, over and above the contribution of fluid intelligence, and it was associated with reduced belief bias on invalid problems. Premise integration ability appears to influence the extent of reliance on heuristic versus analytic processing in transitive inference, when premises and conclusions are presented sequentially. Future research will determine whether and how these findings change when premises and conclusions are presented simultaneously.
Third, it advances understanding of conflict detection which is important in dual process models. Conflict detection scores reflecting sensitivity to the belief-logic conflict were unrelated to analytic processing. An intuitive logic (De Neys, 2012) might account for this finding and for the preference for belief-based over cannot tell errors on conflict problems. This process might be sufficient to detect conflict and to identify when a determinate conclusion is appropriate, but not sufficient to resolve the conflict. The dog is smaller than the goat.
The mouse is smaller than the dog.
The cow is larger than the goat.
Valid Unbelievable
The mandarin is sweeter than the lemon. Therefore the grapefruit is sweeter than the mandarin.
The grapefruit is sweeter than the orange.
The mandarin is less sweet than the orange.
The grapefruit is less sweet than the cherry.
Invalid believable
The car is faster than the bicycle. Therefore the car is faster than the tractor.
The tractor is faster than the train.
The car is slower than the train.
The tractor is slower than the jet.
Invalid unbelievable
The crocodile is more fierce than the shark. Therefore the rabbit is more fierce than the shark.
The rabbit is less fierce than the zebra.
The frog is less fierce than the rabbit.
The shark is more fierce than the zebra.
Non-integrable
The parrot is bigger than the goldfish. Therefore the cat is bigger than the turtle. believable (NB)
The hamster is smaller than the cat
The parrot is smaller than the turtle
The dog is bigger than the cat.
The grass is higher than the flowers. Therefore the seedling is higher than the shrub. unbelievable (NU)
The seedling is higher than the moss.
The grass is lower than the shrub.
The seedling is lower than the tree.
2 Table 2 . 
